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during which the fire occurred, and thus say now, in effect, this
is a very good policy from the 10th to the 13th, if no fire occurs,
but a void one if there does.
One would be hard pressed to find a better example of an unconscionable contract. Furthermore, the insurance company has several available
means of protecting itself against the feared abuses. First, the company
is always free to refuse antedated policies, provided they are also willing to decline the premium. 1 Secondly, the company may direct an
investigation to ascertain if a loss has occurred prior to accepting the
risk.32 Finally, if abuse has occurred, the company may avoid the con3
tract by proving the abuse in court. '

These safeguards are sufficient to protect the insurance companies
from the dishonest applicant. As a result of this case, the insured is
now protected as well. He is protected from a misguided public policy
that gave the insurance companies the option of avoiding their contract in the event they should be called upon to perform their part of
4

the bargain.3

Barry Snell

JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC-CLERICAL OR JUDICIAL ERRORA REMINDER To THE COURTS OF THE PURPOSE OF THE NUNC PRO

As A GUIDE
Comet Aluminum Company, Inc. v. Joe B.
Dibrell,450 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
TUNC ENTRY AND THE BASIC DISTINCTION THAT SERVES

FOR ITS APPLICATION.

Petitioner filed suit against Levine for recovery of a debt. By its
first amended petition, Comet expressly sought three items of recovery:
(1) a debt of $4,354.98; (2) prejudgment interest at the maximum legal
rate from September 12, 1964; and (3) attorney's fees in the sum of
$1,000.00. At the conclusion of the case the judge pronounced judgment in open court on the first and third issues, but did not pronounce
31 Id.

32 This was recognized by Justice Funderburk in Banker's Lloyds v. Montgomery,
42 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931), rev'd, 60 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1933, jdgmt adopted).
33 Matlock v. Hollis, 109 P.2d 119, 132 A.L.R. 1325 (Kan. 1941); Barry v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 81 A.2d 551 (Pa. 1951); State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 112 So.2d 366
(Miss. 1959); Broome v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ass'n, 152 So.2d 827 (La. App. 1963);
Hunt v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 387 P.2d 405 (Colo. 1963); Arley v. United Pac.
Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1967).
34Burch v. Commonwealth Co. Mutual Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1969), rev'd, 450 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Sup. 1970) (dissenting opinion). See also
Service v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 440 P.2d 944 (Kan. 1968):
[C]onsiderations
[..
of public policy make it fundamentally unfair for an insurer
to collect a premium while providing no coverage . ..."
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judgment on the second issue. Conversely, the court's written draft of
the judgment disposed of all three issues: recovery of the debt, recovery
of interest at 6 percent from September 12, 1964, to the date of judgment, and denial of attorney's fees. The written draft was signed by
the judge on August 23, 1968. On December 5, 1968, Levine filed
motion for a nunc pro tunc judgment seeking to correct the written judgment by eliminating the interest award. On January 6, 1969,
the judge refused Levine's motion, whereupon Levine gave notice
for appeal. The judge, on his own motion, rendered and entered a nunc
pro tunc judgment, which, after reciting that judgment for prejudgment interest had not been rendered on August 21, 1968, and that
inclusion of such interest in the August 23, 1968, draft of judgment
was therefore a clerical error, awarded Comet judgment for only the
principal sum of $4,354.98. Subsequently, Levine moved for a new
trial and Comet moved to set aside the nunc pro tunc judgment of the
judge; the court granted Levine a new trial and refused Comet's motion
to set aside the judgment. Held-Petitionfor writ of mandamus denied.
The motions of the petitioner and respondent will be set aside and
a writ of mandamus. will issue should this order be refused.
The courts have had the power to correct, modify or vacate their
judgments' since the first half of the fourteenth century.2 This power
however, must be distinguished from the entry nunc pro tunc, which
gives a court the authority to correct mistakes or supply omissions after
final judgment and at the end of the court's term. 4 The nunc pro tunc
entry was derived from an English statute of the fourteenth century5
under which the courts established the principle that:
... [T]he king's judges of the courts should have the power to examine records, processes, words, pleas, etc., by them and their
clerks, to reform and amend the same in affirmance of the judgments of such records and processes, where the defect appeared to
be due to the misprison of the clerk, so that by such misprison of
the clerk no judgment should be reversed or annulled. 6
This method of correction founded in English legislation and common
law has been adopted by the judicial system of the United States.7 In
1 Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 24 S. Ct. 154, 48 L. Ed. 276 (1903).

2 Makepeace v. Lukens, 27 Ind. 435 (1857).
3 Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 24 S. Ct. 510, 48 L. Ed. 745 (1904).
4 Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
5 Clouser v. Mock, 155 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. 1959).
0 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 188 (1969).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 60; Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Simmonds, 294 U.S. 711, 55
S. Ct. 407, 79 L. Ed. 496 (1935); Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 7 L. Ed.
490 (1829); Illinois Printing Co. v. Electric Shovel Corp., 20 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. 111. 1937):
"Every court has the power to control, vacate, or correct its own decrees in the interests
of justice."
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an early case, a Texas court followed the same pattern of development in its method of correcting and amending errors by stating:
When, in the record of any judgment or decree of any District
Court there shall be any mistake, miscalculation, misrecital, of
any sum or sums of money, or of any name or names, and there
'shall be among the records of the proceedings in the suit which
such judgment or decree shall be rendered any verdict or instrument of writing whereby such judgment or decree may safely be
amended, it shall be the duty of the court in which such judgment
or decree shall be rendered, and the judge thereof to amend the
judgment or decree thereby according to the truth and justice of
the case, provided that the opposite party, his agent or attorney
of record, shall have reasonable notice of the application for such
amendment; and if the transcript of such judgment or decree, at
the time of such amendment, or at any time thereafter, shall be
removed to the Supreme Court, it shall be the duty of that court
upon inspection of such amended record, to be brought before it
by certiorari, if need be, to affirm such judgment, if there be no
other error apparent in such record.'
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the correction or
amendment of mistakes in judgments under rules 316 and 317, the
nunc pro tunc judgment being specifically provided for by rule 316.1
A liberal interpretation of these rules would seem to allow a trial court
almost any type of correction in its judgment at almost any time, 10
thus extending the nunc pro tunc judgment from its primary purpose,
the correction of clerical errors," to include judicial errors. This,
however, is not the case. The law in Texas is well settled: a clerical
error in the entry of a judgment previously rendered may be corrected
after final judgment and at the end of the court's term by a judgment
nunc pro tunc, 12 but a judicial error may not be so corrected. 13 While
8 Ramsey v. McCauley, 9 Tex. 106, 107 (1852); see also Ximenes v. Ximenes, 43 Tex.
458 (1875); Texas State Board of Dental Examiners v. Blankfield, 433 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9TEx. R. Civ. P. 316, 317 (1967).

10 Finley v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Sup. 1968).

11Goodman v. Mayer, 133 Tex. 319, 128 S.W.2d 1156 (1939). "The purpose of a nunc
pro tunc judgment is to record a judgment theretofore pronounced by the court but
which has been imperfectly or erroneously entered;" Huggins v. Johnston, 120 Tex. 21,
35 S.W.2d 688 (1931). "The purpose of a nunc pro tunc entry is to correct evidence upon
the records of a court judgment, decree, or order actually made by the court but for
some reason not entered of record at a proper time;" Stonedale v. Stonedale, 401 S.W.2d
725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ); Conley v. Conley, 229 S.W.2d 926
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, writ dism'd).
12 Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912); Perkins v. Dunlavy, 61 Tex.
241 (1884).
15 Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 289 (1953); Fischer v. Huffman, 254 S.W.
2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, no writ).
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the general principle of law may be well settled, the difficulty in the
utilization of the nunc pro tunc entry lies in determining what is a clerical error and what is a judicial error. The criterion for determination,
as established in the case of Coleman v. Zapp,1 4 is that an alteration
to ". . . correct a judgment because of its rendition, whereby an improper judgment is rendered but is in accordance with the rendition . . ." is judicial, whereas ". . . a proceeding to correct or supply
the minutes of the court so as to have them truly recite the judgment
as actually rendered.. ." is clerical.
Two early cases, which held the judgment error judical, illustrate
this basic distinction. In the case of Bates v. DeCamp,15 the defendants
asked the court to correct the judgment to allow recovery of damages
against the individual members of a partnership as opposed to recovery
against the partnership itself. This application was denied because it
sought an amended rendition of a judgment rather than a correction
of what had actually been rendered. In MissouriPac. Ry. Co. v. Haynes,16
the trial judge awarded to the plaintiffs damages for injury to three
cotton bales. In computing the final damages, which were measured
by the weight of the three lots times a dollar value, the trial judge
through oversight omitted the third lot and accordingly rendered a
wrong amount. In holding the error judical, the court reasoned that
since there was nothing in the record to show how the omission occurred, the manner of committing the error could not be ascertained and
the correction, if allowed, would be making a new verdict for the court.
The court in Coleman v. Zapp 17 distinguishes a clerical error from the
above cases by ruling that the purpose of the proceeding in its case was
*. to correct an entry on the minutes..." as opposed to a correction
of a judgment rendered by the court. Having once laid a predicate for
the basic distinction as to what constitutes a clerical error, the Texas
courts have followed this distinction in numerous cases and have given
examples of the clerical error: mistakes in judgments in the names of
the parties, 8 mistakes in designation of parties themselves, 9 errors in
105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
15 37 S.W. 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd).
16 82 Tex. 448, 18 S.W. 605 (1891).
17 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
18 Chandler v. Scherer, 32 Tex. 573 (1870); Ramsey v. McCauley, 9 Tex. 108 (1852);
McKay v. Speak, 8 Tex. 376 (1852); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearcy, 80 S.W. 2d
1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, no writ); Rogers v. Allen, 80 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, no writ).
19 Whittaker v. Gee, 63 Tex. 435 (1885); Russel v. Miller, 40 Tex. 494 (1894); O'Neil
v. Norton, 33 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding adopted); Batson v. Bently,
297 S.W. 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1927, no writ); Brite v. Atascosa County, 247 S.W.
878 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923, writ dism'd); Smith v. Moore, 212 S.W. 988 (Tex.
Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1919, writ dism'd).
14

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol2/iss1/7

4

Herman: A Reminder to the Courts of the Purpose of the Nunc Pro Tunc Entr

104

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2

calculation and awarding amounts, 20 errors in calls of land description, 21
and miscellaneous clerical errors.22 Judicial errors have been grouped
into the following categories: errors attempted to be corrected on the
merits of the case, 23 corrections that would enlarge the judgment, 24
amendments supplying a judicial omission, 25 and attempts to correct

26
what the court might have done from what the court actually did.
In the instant case the court determined that the rendition of the
judgment was judicial error. The court initially had to determine
whether the judgment was in fact final, and in concluding this point,
relied on Coleman v. Zapp, 27 which held that ".... a judgment's rendition is the judicial act which the court settles and declares the decision
of the law upon the matters at issue." In Knox v. Long,28 the court
quoted Freeman on Judgments29 as stating that a judgment is rendered
when the decision is officially announced, either orally in open court
or by memorandum filed with the clerk. The court in the instant case

reasoned that prejudgment interest is always recoverable when the
principal damages are fixed by conditions existing at the time the injury
is inflicted, 0 and since Comet expressly sought these damages, the trial
court has a duty to decide the issue and render judgment with respect
to them. This duty was not discharged by the oral rendition of the
judgment on the other two issues. The fact that a denial of prejudgment
20 DeHymel v. Scottish American Mortg. Co., 80 Tex. 493, 16 S.W. 311 (1891); Stevens
v. Lee, 70 Tex. 279, 8 S.W. 40 (1888); Swift v. Farris, 11 Tex. 18 (1853); Webster v. Smith,
226 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1950, no writ); Luck v. Riggs Optical, 149
S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941, no writ); Taylor v. Doom, 95 S.W. 4
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ); Ellis v. National City Bank, 94 S.W. 437 (Tex. Civ. App.
1906, no writ).
21 Sabine Hardwood v. West Lumber Co., 248 F. 123 (5th Cir. 1916); Johnson v. McBee,
205 S.W. 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918, writ dism'd); Poietevent v. Scarborough,
117 S.W. 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), rev'd on other grounds, 103 Tex. 111, 124 S.W. 87
(1910); Cetzlander v. Trinity Valley R. Co., 102 S.W. 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no
writ); Mansel v. Castles, 54 S.W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) rev'd on other grounds, 93
Tex. 402, 55 S.W. 559 (1900).
22 Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 291 (1953); Zamora v. Salinas, 422 S.W.2d
253 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); Wiseman v. Zorn, 309 S.W.2d 253
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ).
S23Texas State Board of Examiners of Optometry v. Lane, 337 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd); Acosta v. Realty Trust, 111 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1937, no writ); State Bank and Trust Co. of San Antonio v. Love, 57 S.W.2d
924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933, no writ).
24Arlington v. McDaniel, 119 Tex. 291, 25 S.W.2d 295 (1930); Miller v. Texas Life
Insurance Co., 123 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ ref'd); Montgomery v.
Huff, 11 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, writ ref'd).
25 Finley v. Jones, 435 S.W2d 139 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Jones v. Bass, 49 S.W.2d 723 ('rex.
Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved); Fischer v. Huffman, 24 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1953, no writ); Bell v. Rogers, 58 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1933, no writ).
26 Calvia v. Texas Construction Material Co., 380 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, no writ).
27 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
28 Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 289 (1953).
29 1 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS § 48, at 80.
30 Texas Company v. State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955).
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interest would have been implied in the absence of actual decision, as
illustrated in the case of Vance v. Wilson,31 is immaterial because the
issue of prejudgment interest in the trial court was never raised in the
record of the trial. If the interest question had been discussed, and not
ruled on, it could have been implied that the interest sought had been
denied the petitioner, and thus a correction by a nunc pro tunc entry
would have been proper. If this were the case, then the judgment
would have been saying what the judge intended to say, and the discussion of the interest question in the record would have been evidenced by the record itself. However, since the interest question was
not in the record, it could not be implied that this is what the judge
had intended, and if it was amended, it would be the correction of a
judicial rendition of a judgment, and not a mere clerical error.
While the instant case does not promulgate any new guidelines in
the nunc pro tunc entry, it is a subtle but stern reminder that the
Texas courts will not tolerate a liberal interpretation or use of this procedural tool. The opinion forcefully indicates that if errors are made
it is the responsibility of the judges and the attorneys to recognize these
errors and to use the well-tested remedies designed for that particular
mistake.3 2 These responsibilities weigh heavily on attorneys and judges
in respect to the layman who is so totally ignorant of rules of procedure
and issues of law, but yet is required to be governed by them. Due
to this necessary, but illusory classification of judicial-clerical errors,
it is possible for an individual to have a valid claim in a suit at law,
but through honest mistake or unawareness, either lose his claim entirely or be forced to accept a more difficult method of review than
was available had the mistake not been made. 3 The layman has little
chance of recovery against an officer of the court who errs.
The Comet opinion by ruling the error judicial, vividly reminds us
of the designed purpose of the nunc pro tunc entry, that it should be
used for its intended purpose: the correction of clerical'34errors, and not
... under the guise of correcting a judicial mistake.
Morton L. Herman
31 382 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
32 Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491,

151 SW. 1040 (1912);

Jones

v. Bass, 49 S.AV.2d 723

(Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, opinion adopted); Texas State Board of Examiners of Optometry v. Lane, 337 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd). If the
mistakes are judicial they may be corrected by appeal; if they are clerical they may be
amended by mere motion.
33 Finley v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
34 Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 96 P.2d 796 (Cal. 1939).
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